use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;use std::path::Path;/// Basename used when the Codex executable self-invokes as the Linux sandbox/// helper.pub const CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0: &str = "codex-linux-sandbox";pub fn allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network: bool) -> bool {    // When managed network requirements are active, request proxy-only    // networking from the Linux sandbox helper. Without managed requirements,    // preserve existing behavior.    enforce_managed_network}/// Converts the permission profile into the CLI invocation for/// `codex-linux-sandbox`.////// The helper performs the actual sandboxing (bubblewrap by default + seccomp)/// after parsing these arguments. The profile JSON flag is emitted before/// helper feature flags so the argv order matches the helper's CLI shape. See/// `docs/linux_sandbox.md` for the Linux semantics.#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]pub fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(    command: Vec<String>,    command_cwd: &Path,    permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,    use_legacy_landlock: bool,    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,) -> Vec<String> {    let permission_profile_json = serde_json::to_string(permission_profile)        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("failed to serialize permission profile: {err}"));    let sandbox_policy_cwd = sandbox_policy_cwd        .to_str()        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("cwd must be valid UTF-8"))        .to_string();    let command_cwd = command_cwd        .to_str()        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("command cwd must be valid UTF-8"))        .to_string();    let mut linux_cmd: Vec<String> = vec![        "--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(),        sandbox_policy_cwd,        "--command-cwd".to_string(),        command_cwd,        "--permission-profile".to_string(),        permission_profile_json,    ];    // Proxy-only networking requires bubblewrap's isolated network namespace.    if use_legacy_landlock && !allow_network_for_proxy {        linux_cmd.push("--use-legacy-landlock".to_string());    }    if allow_network_for_proxy {        linux_cmd.push("--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string());    }    linux_cmd.push("--".to_string());    linux_cmd.extend(command);    linux_cmd}/// Converts the sandbox cwd and execution options into the CLI invocation for/// `codex-linux-sandbox`.#[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]fn create_linux_sandbox_command_args(    command: Vec<String>,    command_cwd: &Path,    sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,    use_legacy_landlock: bool,    allow_network_for_proxy: bool,) -> Vec<String> {    let command_cwd = command_cwd        .to_str()        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("command cwd must be valid UTF-8"))        .to_string();    let sandbox_policy_cwd = sandbox_policy_cwd        .to_str()        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("cwd must be valid UTF-8"))        .to_string();    let mut linux_cmd: Vec<String> = vec![        "--sandbox-policy-cwd".to_string(),        sandbox_policy_cwd,        "--command-cwd".to_string(),        command_cwd,    ];    // Proxy-only networking requires bubblewrap's isolated network namespace.    if use_legacy_landlock && !allow_network_for_proxy {        linux_cmd.push("--use-legacy-landlock".to_string());    }    if allow_network_for_proxy {        linux_cmd.push("--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string());    }    // Separator so that command arguments starting with `-` are not parsed as    // options of the helper itself.    linux_cmd.push("--".to_string());    // Append the original tool command.    linux_cmd.extend(command);    linux_cmd}#[cfg(test)]#[path = "landlock_tests.rs"]mod tests;